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The aim of this paper is to discuss new developments in the fi eld of liability 
and compensation for oil pollution damage and to show the benefi ts of accession 
by Adriatic States to the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. The international 
compensation system for oil pollution damage, which has been to a certain extent 
modelled on similar rules for nuclear damage has been working quite well for the 
last forty years and is one of the most successful compensation schemes in existence. 
This paper emphasizes the fact that only membership to all three tiers of compen-
sation (governed by the CLC 1992, Fund 1992 and the 2003 Supplementary 
Fund Protocol) can ensure full fi nancial protection to victims of oil pollution and 
that the accession of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia to the 
2003 Supplementary Fund has been an important step with this regard. The 
lacunae of the system are that the various international conventions currently in 
force, do not cover spills of bunker oil (with certain exceptions with regard tankers), 
nor hazardous and noxious substances. It is proposed therefore that the Adriatic 
States play an important role in the promotion of the Bunker and HNS Conven-
tion which are not yet in force. It is also proposed that questions of civil liability 
should be left separate from questions of criminal liability and that the reopening 
of the CLC Convention is not advisable at this stage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“new dangers demand new solutions…”
As a general rule, torts or wrongs committed by or in relation to ships would 
be governed by the same rules of tort as govern other persons or entities. The 
burden of proof would normally be on the party that claims compensation 
(ex. the victim of oil pollution).1 Such person would have to prove all the ele-
ments of tort. In ship related incidents the most probable scenario is the tort 
of negligence. In order to prove such tort the claimant will have to show that 
there was a duty of care that the duty of care was breached and that damage 
resulted from such breach.2
However, even in the case that the claimant managed to prove all the ele-
ments of the torts, including the quantifi cation of the damage (which is not at 
all an easy task), the claimant would still have to take into account some specifi c 
rules of maritime law, as for example the right of the carrier (shipowner) to limit 
or even in certain cases to exclude its liability.3 It could well happen that under 
general rules, the victim of oil pollution managed to prove all the elements of 
the tort, including the quantifi cation of the damage, but he could not recover 
the loss due to the right of the shipowner, charterer or operator to limit or 
exclude its liability. For this and many other reasons, which will be explained 
later on, the position of a victim of oil pollution under general maritime law 
is not satisfactory. 
*  This paper is partially based on a set of lectures which the authors delivered in the 
framework of the courses on Marine Environmental Law and Marine Insurance (2005, 
2006) at the IMO International Maritime Law Institute in Malta.
1 Popp A., Q. C., Lecture notes on liability and compensation in maritime law as modifi ed 
by international conventions (unpublished), IMO IMLI lecture notes, Malta, 2002.
2 In cases involving pollution from ships other torts may be relevant, as nuisance and 
trespass (see Popp, p. 5) 
3 The right of the carrier to limit his liability together with the notion of general average 
is one of the oldest institutes of general maritime law. This principle is closely related 
to the concept of the “maritime adventure” according to which the many risks of such 
adventure should be borne by all the participants to it (shipowner, cargo owners and 
freight). Another reason for such rules is the desire of states to foster maritime trade 
to increase their fl eets. The concept of a “common maritime adventure” is also deeply 
rooted in the principles of general average, salvage and marine insurance.
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It is our intention therefore to analyze the legal position of the victim of 
oil pollution before and after the adoption of the Civil Liability and Fund 
Conventions and the benefi ts of accession to the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
Protocol.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMPENSATION 
SYSTEM FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
It is interesting that oil pollution was not deemed to be a huge problem 
during the fi rst half of the previous century. The self - cleaning capacity of the 
sea was for centuries considered to be more than suffi cient to deal with wastes 
that entered into it as the result of human activities. The same belief applied 
for wastes originating from ships, including oil.4 This changed dramatically in 
March 1967, when the Liberian registered tanker Torrey Canyon went aground 
off the south west coast of the United Kingdom.5 The spill was the largest spill 
in maritime history up to that point in time and it triggered a reaction from 
media and legislators comparable to that of the Titanic accident in 1912 (or 
the Erika and Prestige accidents in 1999 and 2002).6 
If we leave aside the many practical diffi culties which the coastal states (UK, 
France) experienced when dealing with the accident7 we can recognize that the 
main benefi t of the accident was that it brought to light a number of short-
comings both in public and private international law. These were subsequently 
addressed at the international level with a set of international conventions 
(CLC, Fund, Intervention Convention, MARPOL).
4 The fi rst signs indicating that oceans could not cope with all ship-generated wastes ap-
peared after the introduction of oil as the main fuel for ships (from 1930 to 1950) The 
OILPOL Convention adopted in 1954 represented an improvement with this regard 
although it dealt only with “operational” without embarking on “accidental” oil pollu-
tion. 
5 Some 80,000 tons of crude oil were released causing extensive pollution damage along 
both the British and French coasts.
6 Grbec M., Odgovornost za πkodo zaradi onesnaæenja morskega okolja z nafto, Podjetje 
in delo, No. 2, Ljubljana, 2002, p., 257.
7 All sorts of emergency measures were attempted, many of which made matters even 
worse; lots of chemical dispersants were eventually sprayed onto the oil slicks, but these 
were more lethal for life than the original oil.
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An interesting problem to which public international law did not provide 
a clear answer at that time was whether the coastal state has a right of action 
against a stricken tanker, located in international waters and threatening the 
maritime zones and/or territory of a coastal state.8 The British Government 
asserted that such right exists under customary international law, but this was 
far from being clear.
The incident also raised serious problems with respect to civil liability. The 
arrangements concerning the ownership, management and operation of tank-
ers are usually complex and more likely than not involve important questions 
of private international law. The victims of oil pollution therefore had serious 
problems in identifying the liable party amongst the many interests involved 
in the carriage of oil (shipowner, charterer, operator...) and this represented a 
considerable obstacle to them as to whom to approach and, if necessary, sue 
for compensation. In other words, it was not clear at all who was at the end 
of the day responsible for paying for oil the pollution damage. Even the old 
attorney’s rule stating that “if you are not sure who is the liable - guilty party, 
just sue all of them.” was not without problems, as it was not clear where, in 
which courts, claimants could pursue their claims.9 The traditionally short 
prescription periods which are characteristic of maritime law complicated 
things even further.10
It could well happen therefore, that the claimant managed to overcome 
all the diffi culties related to the identifi cation of the relevant party, burden of 
proof, quantifi cation of the damage, jurisdiction and applicable law, but none-
8  The tanker had grounded in a location, which at the time was outside British territorial 
waters and so the decision of the British authorities to take action against the grounded 
vessel in international waters, including eventual bombing the wreck, was considered 
to be controversial (see Popp, Q. C. - p. 10). This right was in 1969 confi rmed in the 
“Intervention Convention”. 
9 Another important problem faced by the victims was represented by the shipowner’s 
insurance coverage for third parties liabilities (including oil pollution). The majority of 
ships are nowadays entered with one of the P&I clubs (mutual insurer). One of the main 
rules of P&I insurance is the “pay - to be paid rule” according to which a member (in 
most cases a shipowner) in order to be entitled to an indemnity in respect of liabilities 
or expenses incurred by him, “must fi rst himself have discharged the liabilities or expenses con-
cerned”. 
10 Needless to say, that this provision could cause signifi cant hardships to victims of oil 
pollution in cases, where the shipowner is insolvent or bankrupt.
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theless still faced the possibility of the guilty party evading his liability or at 
least limiting it to a relatively small amount.
The lack of clarity in the legal framework for dealing with the legal conse-
quences of this disaster led to a lively public debate. The fi rst practical result 
of the accident was the creation of the Legal Committee of the IMO (at that 
time IMCO) with the mandate of studying the public and private law issues 
raised by this incident.11 However, the newly established legal committee was 
not alone in this effort. An important part was played by the CMI, which 
turned its attention mainly to private law issues having to do with liability and 
compensation. The result of the joint work of the two bodies were two draft 
conventions (the CLC and Intervention Convention12), which together laid the 
foundation internationally, for response to oil pollution accidents. 
The two conventions were adopted together at a diplomatic conference held 
in Brussels in November 1969. The mood at the conference can be best seen 
from the introductory address of the Belgian delegate who stated:
“existing maritime legislation was inadequate to solve the numerous legal problems 
arising out of cat astrophes of this kind, in the fi eld of both public and private law. 
It was essential that solutions be found to those problems. Those solutions would 
probably depart from the traditions of maritime law, but “new dangers demanded 
new solutions”... 
The two conventions provide answers in an innovative way to the many 
legal questions raised by the Torrey canyon incident. The excuse for a departure 
from the traditional rules of maritime law was found in the fact that ships in the 
new era are capable of doing damage to a large undetermined class of victims 
unconnected with the trade, which was not the case in previous times.13 
11 The Legal IMO Legal Committee, which is nowadays an indispensable organ within the 
IMO, was therefore established after and as a result of the Torrey Canyon accident.
12 The Intervention Convention confi rmed the right of a coastal State to “prevent, miti-
gate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastlines or related interests from 
pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil following upon a maritime casualty” 
(Article 2). It confi rmed the right of a coastal state to undertake the necessary actions 
against the stricken vessel located on the high seas, which is threatening the coast and 
related interest.
13 Popp A., Q. C., Lecture notes on liability and compensation in maritime law as modifi ed 
by international conventions (unpublished), IMO IMLI lecture notes, Malta, 2002.
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II.1 Strict liability in international law and the Civil Liability 
Convention (CLC)
The CLC Convention is an excellent example of a successful application of 
what is sometime referred to as the “Titanic effect” (adoption of legislation after 
the occurrence of a maritime disaster). 
The added value of this convention lies in the fact that it provides straight 
answers to specifi c (legal) problems raised by the Torrey Canyon incident. 
The fact that the Civil Liability Convention has been used as a model for all 
subsequent conventions in this fi eld, is an additional proof of its success.14 It 
must be emphasized however, that the CLC Convention does not cover all 
types of pollution damage15 caused by oil, but only persistent oils16 carried 
as cargo. Bunkers spills from non-tankers, chemicals and light diesel oils are 
therefore excluded. 
The CLC Convention addressed three main questions, which arose as a 
result of the Torrey Canyon accident: a.) Whom to sue?; b.) The right of the 
shipowner to limit or exclude his liability; (c ) Jurisdiction of the Court?
i. Whom to sue?
One of the main improvements of the Civil Liability Convention is the 
incorporation of the principle of ship owner’s strict liability. The purpose of 
such “channelling” of liability is obviously to help victims of oil pollution eas-
ily fi nd the liable party.
14 HNS, Bunker Convention.
15 Pollution damage is according to Article 1 of the 1992 CLC defi ned as loss or damage 
caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil 
from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation 
for the impairment of the environment other than loss or profi t for such impairment 
shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or 
to be undertaken; the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures.
16 Persistent oils are those oils, which because of their chemical composition, are usually 
slow to dissipate naturally when spilled into the marine environment and are therefore 
likely to spread and so require cleaning up (crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubri-
cating oil).
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This was not a completely new concept in international law, as it had been 
already embodied in some nuclear conventions adopted in the fi fties and sixties 
of the previous century. An interesting convention which most likely infl uenced 
the drafters of the Civil Liability Convention was the Convention on the Liability 
of Operators of Nuclear Ships, adopted in 1962, which contained at least three 
elements particularly important for subsequent civil liability conventions in the 
maritime fi eld: (i) strict or absolute liability on the part of a specifi c party (in 
this case the operator of a nuclear ship), (ii.) channelling of liability to that party 
to the exclusion of all other potential parties and (iii.), last but not least, the 
obligation to maintain insurance or other fi nancial security. Needless to say 
that these elements represent important departures from the ordinary rules of 
tort law, while the obligation to maintain insurance represents an important 
departure from the general rules of insurance law.17
According to the CLC Convention (1969 and 1992) claims for pollution 
damage can be made only against the registered owner of the ship concerned. 
Claims against servants or agents of the ship owner are, according to the 1969 
CLC Convention, expressly prohibited. The 1992 Protocol is still clearer in this 
regard. It prohibits not only claims against the servants or agents of the owner, 
but also claims against the pilot, the charterer (including a bareboat charterer), 
manager or operator of the ship, or any person carrying out salvage operations 
or taking preventive measures.18 The owner is therefore liable irrespective of 
the existence of any fault or negligence.
Furthermore, the owner of a tanker carrying more than 2 000 tones of 
persistent oil as cargo is obliged to maintain insurance to cover his liability 
under the applicable CLC Convention. Under the CLC Conventions claims 
for pollution damage can be brought directly against the insurer.19 
The victim of oil pollution can therefore pursue its claim against the register 
shipowner, its insurer (right to a direct action) or both. No doubt that the situ-
ation of a victim of oil pollution has been improved considerably. 
17 Popp, Q. C., Lecture notes, IMO IMLI, 2002.
18 The identifi cation is based on administrative evidence - person or persons registered as 
the owner of the ship or, in the absence of registration, person or persons owning the 
ship (Article 3 (4) of the 1992 CLC Convention).
19 Taking into account that the shipowner’s insurer in most cases is a P& I Club, the right 
to a direct action represents a substantial departure from the traditional P& I rules, “pay 
to be paid”.
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ii. Right of the shipowner to exclude or limit his liability
The ship owner is exempt from liability under the CLC Convention only 
if he proves that the damage resulted from an act of war, by sabotage by a 
third party or that the damage was wholly caused by the negligence of public 
authorities in maintaining lights or other navigational lights.20
If the damage resulted as a result of one of the listed exceptions the owner 
of the vessel is exempt from liability. Otherwise, the owner is strictly liable, 
however, he can limit his liability to an amount which is linked to the ton-
nage of the vessel. In the 1992 CLC Convention, the limits of liability were 
increased, for ships of 2.000 tons or less, from 133 SDR per limitation ton to 
a fi xed amount of 3 million SDR (US$ 4 million). And the maximum amount 
payable by the ship owner has changed from 14 million SDR to 59.7 million 
SDR (US$ 75 million). According to the 2000 amendments (which entered into 
force on 1st of November 2003), the maximum amount payable by the shipowner 
has been increased to 89.770.000 SDR.21 
As a result of the increased limits of liability, the test for breaking the ship 
owner’s right of limitation has moved from “actual fault or privity” of the ship 
owner, which was incorporated in the 1969 CLC Convention, to the concept 
of “wilful misconduct of the ship owner”. Therefore, according to the 1992 
CLC Convention, the ship owner is deprived of his right to limit his liability 
only if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted from the ship owner’s 
personal act or omission, committed with intent to cause such damage, or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result. This 
change, which brings the test into line with the test in the 1976 Convention 
on limitation of liability for maritime claims,22 will make the ship owner’s right 
to limit much stronger.23
20 Article 3 (2) of the 1992 CLC Convention.
21 Article 3 (1) of the 1992 CLC Convention.
22 Article 4 of the 1976 Limitation Convention states that “A person liable shall not be 
entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or 
omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowl-
edge that such loss would probably result.” 
23 The burden of proof is on the victim and therefore these limits are many times referred 
to as the “unbreakable limits”.
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iii. Jurisdiction of the Court 
The jurisdiction of the court is provided by article IX of the CLC Conven-
tion, according to which court action must be brought in a state or states where 
the pollution damage occurred. If the pollution damage occurred in the EEZ 
(or equivalent zone)24 of a State A, court action must be brought only in front 
of the competent court of that State. If the pollution damage affected more 
than one State, for example State A and State B, then the court action must 
be brought in one of the two affected states, at the claimant’s choice.
However, if the ship owner is entitled to limitation, he must constitute a 
limitation fund in the competent court of a State party to the CLC where the 
pollution occurred. The constitution of the limitation fund result in the pro-
tection of the ship owner’s other assets and the release of any of his ships that 
may have been arrested. In other words, after the constitution of the limitation 
fund, claims can be submitted only against that fund. 
After the Fund has been constituted, the Courts of the State in which the 
fund is constituted shall be exclusively competent to determine all matters 
relating to the apportionment and distribution of the fund.25 
The CLC Convention therefore provided clear rules also with regard the 
jurisdiction of the court and alleviates the burden of proof in this regard.
II.2 The Role of the IOPC Fund(s) in the international compensation 
system 
The 1969 CLC Convention solved most of the legal problems which arose 
as a result of the Torrey Canyon accident, albeit not to the principal one felt by 
victims of oil pollution - the right of the shipowner to limit or in certain cases to 
exclude its liability. The CLC Convention was therefore complemented in 1971 
with another Convention, which created an international fund (organization), 
from which victims of oil pollution can claim compensation in cases where the 
shipowner is able to limit or completely exclude its liability.26 The 1971 Fund 
Convention was later amended by the 1992 Protocols, which brought to light 
24 Exclusive Fisheries Zone, Fisheries - Ecological Zone, Ecological Zone.
25 Article IX (3)
26 See also Art. 235 of the UNCLOS Convention.
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a separate international Fund, the 1992 IOPC Fund, with a wider scope of ap-
plication and higher limits of liability.27 With the entry into force of the 2003 
Supplementary Fund protocol in 2005, a third international tier (or fund) 
providing compensation to victims of oil pollution was established.
The function of the Funds is to provide compensation to victims of oil 
pollution in a State party to the relevant Fund Convention in cases where 
the victims do not obtain full compensation under the applicable CLC Con-
vention.28 However, even the liability of the IOPC Fund is limited. As of 1st 
November 2003,29 the total amount available under the 1992 Conventions 
increased from 135 million to 203 million SDR, and if three States contribut-
ing to the Fund receive more than 600 million tonnes of oil per annum, the 
maximum amount is raised to 300.740.000 SDR.30 As two of the main oil 
importers, China and USA are not state parties to the 1992 IOPC Fund, this 
is quite unlikely to happen.31
The IOPC Funds do not pay compensation if the damage occurred in a State 
which was not a member of the respective Fund at the time of the accident, if 
the pollution damage resulted from an act of war or was caused by a spill from 
27 Under the 1992 Conventions the geographic scope is wider. The coverage extends also 
to damage occurred in the Exclusive Economic Zone, or equivalent area of a State party, 
as for example the Exclusive Fishery Zone. The 1992 Conventions cover also the cost of 
preventive measures before the spill has actually occurred, while the “old” conventions 
cover only the costs of preventive measures, taken after oil has actually been spilled.
Furthermore, the new protocols apply, in certain circumstances; also to spills of tankers 
during ballast voyages. This right is limited only to voyages, which follow the actual car-
riage of oil by sea, if it is not proved, that there are no residues of such carriage of oil in 
bulk aboard.
28 Article 3 (2) of the CLC Conventions.
29 The amount of compensation which is available from the 1971 Fund could not exceed 
60 million SDR (US$ 76 million), including the sum actually paid by the shipowner, 
under the relevant CLC Convention.
30 As two main oil importers, USA and China are not State parties to the 1992 Fund, this 
fi gure is almost impossible to achieve. 
31 A State party cannot join the 1992 IOPC Fund without being a state party to the 1992 
CLC Convention, the opposite is possible. If a State is a state party only to the CLC 
Convention, then the victims of oil pollution in that state cannot claim compensation 
from the IOPC Fund, while the shipowner is entitled to limit or exclude its liability on 
the basis of the Convention. Such situation is clearly unsatisfactory, although some 
states, the most notably example being China, have opted for it.
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a warship or if the claimant cannot prove that the damage resulted from an in-
cident involving one or more ships as defi ned in the applicable convention.32
Under the applicable CLC or FUND Convention actions for compensation 
against the shipowner, his insurer or ultimately the IOPC Fund, have to be 
fi lled before the Courts of the State Party to that Convention in the territory, 
territorial sea or EEZ of which damage was caused.33 However, in most cases 
a settlement has been achieved out of court.
If the total amount of the claims exceeds the total amount of compensation 
available under the CLC and Fund Convention, the compensation paid to each 
claimant would be reduced proportionately.
III. CONTRIBUTORS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMPENSATION 
SYSTEM FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
The international compensation system for oil pollution damage is fi nanced 
by two major groups of contributors: shipowners (and their insurers) on the basis 
of the CLC and oil importers (oil industry) on the basis of the Fund Conven-
tion. Registered shipowners are obliged to pay compensation to victims of oil 
pollution after an accidents has occurred on the basis of the provisions of the 
CLC Convention. On the other hand, the oil industry is fi nancing the second 
tier (and third tier) through contributions to the IOPC Fund (s).
Contributors to the IOPC Fund are “persons,”34 which have received more 
than 150.000 tons of contributing oil in a State Party during the course of a 
calendar year.35 Contributors are not states, but persons (mostly oil companies), 
which have received in the relevant calendar year more than 150.000 tons of 
crude oil or heavy fuel oil (contributing oil) in ports or terminal installations 
in a State which is a member of the relevant Fund, after the carriage by sea.36 
32 Sea going vessel or sea borne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the 
carriage of oil in bulk as cargo (Art. 1 CLC)
33 Art. 9 (1) of the CLC Convention and Art 7 (1) of the IOPC Fund Convention.
34 Person means any individual or partnership or any public or private body, whether cor-
porate or not, including a State or any of its constituent subdivisions. (Article 1 (2) of 
the 1992 CLC Convention).
35 IOPC FUNDS ANNUAL REPORT 2005, Report on the activities of the IOPC Funds 
in 2005, London.
36 The major contributors to the 1992 IOPC Fund, in the calendar year 1999, were Japan 
(21.15% of the total), Italy (11.25%), Republic of Korea (10.29 %), and Netherlands 
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The relevant element is the carriage of oil by sea and not the carriage of oil 
from one state to another. 
The obligations to pay contributions also arises in cases where oil is trans-
ported between two ports or terminals within the same State or transported by 
ship from an offshore production rig. Contributions are paid by the individual 
contributors directly to the IOPC Fund; however the State shall communicate 
every year to the relevant Fund the name and address of any person in that State 
who is liable to contribute,37 as well as the quantity of contributing oil received 
by any such person (submission of oil report). Governments are not responsible 
for these payments, unless they voluntarily accepted such responsibility.38 
However, even the liability of the 1992 Fund is limited (203 million SDR). If 
the total amount of claims exceeds the total amount of compensation available 
under the CLC and Fund Convention, the compensation paid to each claimant 
would be reduced proportionately. The two largest tankers accident in the last 
decade (Prestige & Erika) showed that the amount of liability provided by the 
1992 IOPC Fund (together with the shipowner and or his insurer) may not be enough 
to cover the entire damage which could arise out of a single major accident. 
The victims were facing therefore the prospect of a proportionate payment, 
which was not deemed to be an appropriate solution for many states, and in 
particular it was not deemed to be an appropriate solution for state parties of 
the European Union.
IV. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 2003 SUPPLEMENTARY 
FUND PROTOCOL
The maritime sector is a global sector and therefore a global initiative under 
the auspices of the IMO should be preferred over a regional one. In practice 
regional initiatives by the EU and US have often triggered a reaction from the 
IMO, and the establishment of the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol was 
not an exception. 
(8.28 %). The USA is not a State party neither to the CLC nor to the Fund Conven-
tions. It has its “national” compensation system, which is enacted in the Oil Pollution 
Act (1990).
37 Only persons who received more than 150.000 tons of contributing oil should be re-
ported.
38 IOPC Annual Report 2005, London, pp. 29 - 31.
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After the Erika accident in 1999, the European Commission proposed two 
packages of legislation aimed at improving safety at sea, named Erika I. and 
Erika II. One of these measures (the third proposal of the Erika Package II), also 
contained some additional measures aimed at upgrading the international 
system for liability and compensation for oil pollution damage. 
With this proposal the Commission proposed the establishment of an ad-
ditional European Fund (COPE), which would provide compensation for oil 
pollution damage up to 1 billion Euros, instead of ca 200 million EUR, and 
the imposition of severe penalties on polluters (not just to oil polluters, but also 
to others such as bunker oil, chemicals).39
The proposal triggered the reaction of the IMO, which in order to prevent a 
“regional approach” adopted in May 2003, a Protocol to the 1992 Fund Conven-
tion, under which an independent “supplementary” fund was established, open 
to all States, not just to EU Members. Therefore, from 2005, State parties to 
the 1992 Fund may opt to join (but they are not compelled to) a new interna-
tional Fund, which provides compensation to victims of oil pollution in those 
relatively rare cases where the compensation provided by the 1992 CLC and 
Fund Convention does not suffi ce to cover the entire damage. 
The main reason for creating a new international Fund was to avoid “pro rata 
payments” in cases of major accidents (as the Erika, Prestige). The participation 
within this Fund is optional and is open to all States, which are States parties 
to the 1992 CLC Convention. Accordingly, in order for a state to join the 2003 
Supplementary Fund, it must fi rst be a state party to the 1992 CLC and Fund 
Convention. The three conventions are therefore closely interrelated. 
The function of the 2003 Fund protocol is to supplement the functioning 
of the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions, but only in states which are parties 
to the Protocol. It must be emphasized nonetheless, that the 2003 is a separate 
legal entity (international organization) with its own organs.40
Since the entry into force of the Supplementary Fund in 2005,41 the to-
tal amount of compensation payable for any one incident has been limited 
39 In addition to the creation of the COPE Fund, the proposal also includes the introduc-
tion of a sanction or a fi nancial penalty, to be imposed on any party, whether a ship-
owner, a charterer, a classifi cation society or anybody else, who has contributed to the 
oil pollution by his grossly negligent conduct or omissions.
40 For the time being the director of the 1992 IOPC Fund is also the Director of the 2005 
Supplementary Fund protocol and the Funds also have a common secretariat.
41 The entry into force requirements were ratifi ed by at least eight States which have re-
ceived a combined total of 450 million tons of contributing oil. These requirements were 
met in December 2004. 
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to a combined total of 750 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) (just over 
US$1,145 million) including the amount of compensation payable under the 
existing 1992 CLC/Fund Convention). Some States, including Japan, advocated 
unlimited liability, but this proposal was ultimately rejected.42
An obvious conclusion is therefore, that in order to get full (fi nancial) pro-
tection for damages arising out of a spill of oil from tankers, a State should 
join both the 1992 IOPC Fund and the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol 
(if we leave aside the Bunker Convention and the HNS).43 
(ii.) Improvements brought by the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol
The main function of the Supplementary Fund is to pay additional com-
pensation to any person suffering pollution damage if that person has been 
unable to obtain full and adequate compensation for an ‘established claim’ under 
the terms of the 1992 Fund Convention.44 In other words, if the victim of oil 
pollution has been unable to obtain full compensation from the shipowner, his 
insurer and the 1992 IOPC Fund, and if the damage has occurred within the 
EEZ, territorial sea, internal waters or territory of a state party to the 2003 
Supplementary Fund protocol, then he is entitled to compensation for the 
remaining difference from the 2003 Supplementary Fund. 
The 2003 Fund may be obliged to pay compensation because either: (i) the 
total damage exceeds, or (ii) there is a risk that it will exceed, the applicable 
limit of compensation laid down in the 1992 Fund Convention in respect of 
any one incident (203 million SDR). 
Victims of oil pollution cannot claim compensation automatically from the 
2003 Supplementary Fund, as two other requirements are needed: (i) there must 
42 It is expected, however, that the increased compensation which is approaching one bil-
lion Euros, will put an end to the practice of pro-rating of payment of claims, which has 
led to criticisms of the 1992 Convention. 
43 The 2003 Fund will supplement the compensation available under the 1992 Civil Li-
ability Convention (CLC) and the International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND), with an 
additional, third tier of compensation. The scope of application of the 2003 Supplemen-
tary Fund Protocol is in line with the scope of application of the 1992 CLC and Fund 
Conventions.
44 Art. 4(1) of the Supplementary Fund Protocol.
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be an established claim and ii.) in practice there must be a fi nal or temporary 
decision of the Assembly of the 1992 IOPC Fund that payment will be made 
only for a portion of the claim. The Assembly of the Supplementary Fund will 
then decide whether and to what extent the Supplementary Fund shall pay 
the portion of any established claim (provisionally) not paid under the 1992 
CLC and the 1992 Fund Convention.
It is proposed now to assess the requirements which must be fulfi lled in 
order for a victim of oil pollution to get compensation from the 2003 Sup-
plementary Fund. 
First of all there must be “an established claim”.45 A mere assertion or 
claim that the damage has occurred is not enough. In most cases the IOPC 
will recognize a certain claim with an out of court settlement. In some other 
cases, especially where the victim of oil pollution and the 1992 Fund could 
not agree on the existence or extent of the damage, the fi nal decision will be 
reached by the judgment of a competent court(s) in a state party, which shall 
not be subject to ordinary forms of reviews.46 
The second requirement for the payment of compensation is that the 1992 
IOPC Fund considers that the total amount of the established claims exceeds, 
or there is a risk that the total amount of established claims will exceed, the 
aggregate amount of compensation available under the 1992 Fund Convention 
and as a consequence the 1992 Fund (its Assembly) has decided provisionally 
or fi nally that payments will only be made for a proportion of any established 
claim.
In such cases the 2003 Supplementary Fund is liable to pay the remaining 
compensation (the difference between the established claim and the amount recovered 
under the 1992 CLC & Fund Convention) as well as in cases where the Assembly 
of the 1992 IOPC Fund has decided just provisionally, in order to protect the 
interest of all claimants also future, to undertake a “pro rata payment”. The 2003 
Supplementary Fund retains the right of subrogation against the 1992 Fund, 
in cases the later increases the level of payment or pays the entire damage. 
45 The defi nition of an “established claim” is found in Article 1 Paragraph 8 of the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol according to which this is a “claim which has been recog-
nized by the 1992 Fund or been accepted as admissible by decision of a competent court 
binding upon the 1992 Fund and not subject to ordinary forms of review, and which 
would have been fully compensated if the limit set out in Article 4 paragraph 4 of the 
1992 Fund Convention had not applied to that incident”. 
46 See Article 1(8) of the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol.
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(iii.) Contributors to the 2003 Supplementary Fund
The 2003 Supplementary Fund protocol is an amendment to the 1992 
Fund Convention and not to the CLC Convention. This formally means that 
it should be fi nanced by oil interests (receivers of oil) and not by the shipowning 
interest (shipowner, P&I Clubs).
Accordingly, annual contributions to the Fund should be made in respect of 
each Contracting State, by any person who, in any calendar year, has received 
total quantities of oil exceeding 150,000 tons.47 Contributors to the 2003 
Supplementary Fund are therefore the same as with regard to the 1992 CLC 
Fund. This in turn means that contributors (in most cases oil companies) have 
to pay two separate contributions, the fi rst to the 1992 IOPC Fund and the 
second under the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol.
(iv.) Article 14 of the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol 
 (a membership fee)
The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol is modelled on the 1992 Fund Con-
vention, but there is one important difference which is worth mentioning.
An interesting feature of the 1992 Fund Convention is the fact, that in 
the absence of contributors (therefore if there are no companies receiving more than 
150.000 tonnes of persistent oil in a state party), the coverage provided by the 
1992 IOPC is a “free service”.48 Such situation can be only explained by the 
fact that the “international compensation system for oil pollution damage” is 
a sort of “mutual insurance”, based on the concept of international solidarity 
where payment of compensation to victims of oil pollution in one state are in 
most cases fi nanced by the payment of contributions in another state.49 The 
47 Contributions should be paid by those oil receivers in a state party which in a calendar 
year, have received, in total, quantities exceeding 150,000 tons in the ports or terminal 
installations of the state by sea carriage, and in any installations situated in that terri-
tory which have been carried by sea and discharged in a port or terminal installation of 
a non-Contracting State.
48 A case which proves this fact is the example of the Republic of Slovenia, where there are 
no contributors, and accordingly the coverage provided by the 1992 FUND is a “free 
service”. 
49 It is rather strange therefore that certain states which do not have big oil importers have 
not ratifi ed or at least have waited long before ratifying the 1992 Fund Convention. For 
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2003 Supplementary Fund brought an important change with this regard, 
and this is of utmost importance for states as Slovenia, with no oil importers 
(persons) bound to contribute to the IOPC Fund.
Article 14 of the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol provides for what is 
nowadays referred to as the “membership fee”. According to the mentioned article 
there must be a minimum aggregate receipt of 1,000,000 tons of contributing 
oil in each Contracting State.
This means that, if the actual receipts of contributing oil in a state are less 
than 1 million tons, there is deemed to be a minimum receipt of 1 million 
tons of contributing oil in the state, and the Contracting State which chooses 
to become a party in such circumstances to the Protocol assumes the liability 
to pay the contribution based on the deemed 1 million tons receipt, or the 
difference between the 1 million tons deemed receipt and the actual receipts 
within the state which fall within the Protocol.
Therefore, if there are no contributors in a State party to the 2003 Supple-
mentary Fund Protocol, the State itself will have to arrange for the payment of 
contribution based on 1 million tones deemed receipt. In cases that there are 
some contributors, which however together declared less than 1 million tones of 
contributing cargo, then the contracting State will have to pay for the difference 
or for the whole amount based on the 1 million tones deemed receipt.50 
There are mainly two reasons for the inclusion of such a provision into the 
text of the protocol. The fi rst reason is quite obvious. Due to the extensive cov-
erage provided by the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol, there was a need to 
ensure at least a minimum contribution to the very considerable compensation 
offered by the Supplementary Fund. A situation where certain states would be 
covered by the 2003 Supplementary Fund (for more than 1 bn EUR), without 
contributing anything, was not deemed to be appropriate anymore.51
The second reason is less straightforward. It seems that with the proposal 
for the inclusion of the “membership fee”, the Funds tried to enforce the proper 
reporting of oil receipts by the governments, which has proved to be one of the 
example, the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions in the Republic of Slovenia entered into 
force only in 2001, almost fi ve years after the entry into force of the 1992 CLC & Fund 
Conventions. 
50 That means that the member state is liable to pay contributions for a quantity of con-
tributing oil corresponding to the difference between 1 mio tones and the aggregate 
quantity of actual contributing oil receipts reported in respect of that state. 
51 Art. 14 of the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol.
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major problems in the functioning of the international compensation Fund. 
The reason is quite logical. It is expected that State parties will take this ob-
ligation much more seriously, as in the absence of such report, the State itself 
will have to pay a contribution based on 1 million tones deemed receipt.52 The 
importance of the submission of oil report can be seen also from Article 15 of 
the Supplementary Fund Protocol according to which ”… no compensation shall 
be paid by the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol for pollution damage in respect of a 
given incident or in respect of preventive measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimize 
such damage, until the obligations to communicate to the Director of the Supplementary 
Fund according to the article 13, paragraph 1 and paragraph 1 of this article have been 
complied with within one year after the Director of the Supplementary Fund has notifi ed 
the contracting state of its failure to report”.53
For States as Slovenia, which do not have big receivers of oil on its territory 
(contributors), the provision embodied in Article 14 of the Supplementary 
Fund Protocol is of utmost importance.
(v.) Jurisdiction of the court in cases involving the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol
Jurisdiction is dealt with in Article 7 of the Protocol and for the most part 
mirrors the provisions of the 1992 Fund Convention.54 In order to understand 
52 Contracting States are obliged according to Article 13 of the 2003 Protocol to communi-
cate to the Director of the Supplementary Fund the relevant information on oil receipts 
in accordance with Article 15 of the 1992 Fund Convention. However, communications 
made to the Director of the 1992 Fund under Article 15 paragraph 2 of the 1992 Fund 
Convention will be deemed also to have been made under the 2003 Protocol. 
53 Another important consideration which should “force” states to submit this communica-
tion is the fact (provision) according to which if the Contracting State does not fulfi ll 
its obligations to submit this communication and this results in a fi nancial loss for the 
Supplementary Fund, that State will be obliged to compensate the Supplementary Fund 
for such loss (Article 13(2)).
54 According to Article VII of the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol “Where an action 
for compensation for pollution damage has been brought before a court competent un-
der Article IX of the 1992 CLC against the shipowner or his insurer/guarantor, such 
court shall have exclusive jurisdictional competence over any action against the Supple-
mentary Fund for compensation, unless that court is in a Contracting State which is not 
a party to the 2003 Protocol, in which case, the action against the Supplementary Fund 
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the rationale of Article VII, we have to make reference also to Article IX of the 
1992 CLC Convention and to Article XV of the 1992 Fund Convention. 
As a general rule, the competent court should be a Court of the State where 
the pollution damage occurred and where the shipowner established a limita-
tion fund. What might happen in practice is that the pollution damage affects 
more than one State and that an action against the shipowner and the 1992 
Fund has been brought in front of a competent court of a State, which is a 
State party to the 1992 CLC (and FUND) Convention, but not to the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol. 
Article VII provides a clear answer to this dilemma. In such cases, victims of 
oil pollution may claim compensation either before a court of the State where the 
Supplementary Fund has its headquarters (UK) or before any court of a Contracting State 
to the 2003 Protocol, competent under Article IX of the 1992 CLC. It seems that 
in such cases claims will most likely be brought in front of domestic courts.
V. BALANCE OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol is an amendment to the 1992 
Fund Convention and accordingly it should be fi nanced by “oil receivers” 
(persons) in state parties to the 2003 Supplementary Protocol. The Protocol 
therefore does not impose any additional fi nancial burden on shipowners and 
their insurers. It is clear that such situation could have altered the balance of 
contributions between shipowners and oil receivers which is one of the pillars 
of the international system. According to representatives of the oil industry, 
such situation would be also unfair. 
Some States and the European Commission were (and obviously still are) of 
the opinion that the time was right for a reopening and for a more substantive 
amendment of the CLC convention. Amendments should have touched also 
upon fundamental principles of the international system such as the strict 
liability of the shipowner, the immunity of certain layers as for example char-
terers, and the modifi cation of the test for breaking the limits of liability of 
shall at the option of the claimant: (i) be brought either before a court of the State where 
the Supplementary Fund has its headquarters (UK), (ii) or before any court of a Con-
tracting State to the 2003 Protocol, competent under Article IX of the 1992 CLC.”
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the shipowner (wilful misconduct).55 On the other hand, some other States were 
worried that the reopening and substantial amendment of the Civil Liability 
Convention could endanger the functioning of the entire international system, 
which has worked quite well for almost forty years.56
The Assembly of the 1992 IOPC Fund created in the year 2000 a working 
group with the task of assessing whether there is a need to amend the existing 
international compensation system. It was this working group which proposed 
the establishment of an optional additional compensation Fund (also under 
the infl uence of the European proposal to establish COPE). Additionally, the point 
was made that the Supplementary Fund fi nanced permanently by oil receiv-
ers could distort the balance between the contributions of shipowners and oil 
receivers to the regime.57
As it was not possible to achieve agreement within the working group about 
the amendment, even if limited of the Convention, the Working Group was 
dismantled in October 2005.
Nonetheless, the shipowning interests (shipowners and insurers) were well 
aware that it is crucial to maintain an equitable balance between the burdens 
imposed on the two industries. They argued that a voluntary increase of the 
limits of liability of the shipowner, without the formal amendment of the 1992 
CLC Convention, is the right way forward. 
At the March 2005 IOPC Fund Assembly session, the International Group 
of P&I Clubs indicated that it decided to increase, on a voluntary basis, the 
limitation amount for small tankers, by means of an agreement to be known as 
the STOPIA (Small Tankers Oil Pollution Indemnifi cation Agreement). A voluntary 
increase of liability, in order to prevent the amendment of a certain international 
regime (convention) is defi nitely a new approach in international maritime law. 
55 The European Commission proposed for example: lowering the threshold for loss of the 
limitation right of the shipowner (intent/recklessly+knowledge  gross negligence), and 
removing the protection of certain other key players from practically any liability at all.
56 For more information about this process please consult the IOPC web site at: www.iop-
cfund.org 
57 Shipowners and their insurers took the view that the issues related to shipowners’ li-
ability should not be reopened, since to do so would be detrimental to the positions of 
victims of oil pollution. They pointed out that the international compensation system 
has at its centre the protection of the victim of oil pollution and not the achievement of 
other “policy reasons”, as the safety of navigation or decreasing the number of oil spills. 
The majority view was that questions of civil liability should be kept separate from ques-
tions of criminal liability. 
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V.1 STOPIA 2005
The STOPIA 2005 was basically a proposal for a voluntary increase in the 
limit of liability for small tankers (up to 29,548 GT) under CLC which would 
be applied only for “oil pollution damage” in state parties to the 2003 Protocol. 
The main reason for the devising of STOPIA were data from various studies 
(some of them undertaken by the Fund itself), according to which the main imbalance 
between the contributions paid by the oil industry and shipowning interests is 
seen with regard to small tankers (less than 30.000 GT). 58 
Under STOPIA the owners of relevant tankers of 29,548 GT or less would 
contract with the 1992 Fund to reimburse claims paid in excess of the relevant 
limit of liability under the 1992 CLC up to SDR 20 million per incident. This 
voluntary agreement therefore gives to the Fund the right to claim reimburse-
ment from the shipowners P&I Club for the difference actually paid and 20 
million SDR.59
At the Assembly’s 2005 Session, held in October of the same year, the Inter-
national Group of P&I Clubs made another proposal, subject to the condition 
that the revision of the conventions was not carried forward. The international 
group of P & I Clubs proposed to extend STOPIA to all State Parties to the 
1992 Civil Liability Conventions and to establish a second agreement to be 
known as the tanker oil pollution indemnifi cation agreement (TOPIA), through 
which Clubs would indemnify the Supplementary Funds in respect of 50 % of 
the amounts paid in compensation by the Fund.60 These two agreements have 
become known as STOPIA and TOPIA 2006. 
58 It is presumed that this imbalance is caused by the low limits of liability of the shipown-
ers in cases small tankers are involved. For tankers of 5.000 GT or less the shipowner is 
entitled to limit its liability to a fi xed amount of 4.510.000 SDR. 
59 STOPIA 2005 applied to all ships insured by one of the P&I Clubs that are members 
of the International Groups of such Clubs and reinsured through the Group’s pooling 
agreement. The agreement came into force on 3rd March 2005, the date of the entry 
into force of the Supplementary Fund Protocol. 
60 After the dismantlement of the Working Group, the Assembly of the IOPC Fund in-
structed the Director to co-operate with the international group of P & I Clubs (on behalf 
of the shipping industry) and with the OCIMF (Oil Companies International Marine Forum) 
before the offi cial agreement package was submitted to the Assembly and to provide 
technical and administrative advice with a view of consolidating the package and ensure 
that it is legally enforceable.
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V.2 STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006 
As a result of discussion between the Director of the IOPC Fund, the Inter-
national Groups of P&I Clubs and OCIMF, the International Group of P&I 
Clubs, has developed a voluntary package, consisting of a revised Small Tanker 
Oil Pollution Indemnifi cation Agreement (STOPIA 2006) and the TOPIA 
(Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnifi cation Agreement).
STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006 are contractually binding agreements 
between shipowners, which nonetheless gave to the relevant IOPC Fund the 
right of enforcement. The shipowners therefore have still the right to limit 
their liability or exclude their liability according to the limits embodied in 
the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, while on the other hand the victims 
must still claim compensation from the 1992 and 2003 Funds accordingly. 
However, the TOPIA and STOPIA give to shipowners an enforceable right to 
claim reimbursement from the P&I Clubs up to the limits envisaged by the 
two voluntary schemes. 
The aim of the new package is clearly to achieve a balance of contributions 
between the oil industry and the shipowning interests, both with regard to 
accidents which would occur in State parties to the 1992 CLC and Fund Con-
vention (STOPIA 2006) and in cases where the 2003 Supplementary Fund is 
involved (TOPIA 2006). The difference between the STOPIA 2005 and the 
revised STOPIA is that the revised voluntary schemes applies to all States in 
which the 1992 Fund Protocol is in force, and no longer only to State parties 
to the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. 
STOPIA 2006 applies for pollution damage in States for which the 1992 
Fund is in place. The said agreement is a contract between owners of small 
tankers (of 29.548 GT or less) to increase, on a voluntary basis, the limitation 
amount applicable to the tanker under the 1992 Civil Liability regime. The 
contract will apply to small tankers entered in one of the P&I Clubs which are 
members of the international group and reinsured through the pooling agree-
ment of the International group. 
The characteristics of STOPIA 2006 are therefore the same as those of 
STOPIA 2005, with the notable differences that the new STOPIA applies to 
States parties of the 1992 Fund Convention and not only to those which are 
also parties to the 2003 Supplementary Fund protocol.61 The effect of STOPIA 
61 The main substantive difference between the original STOPIA and STOPIA 2006 is 
that, whereas the original STOPIA applied only to pollution damage in Supplementary 
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is therefore that the maximum amount of compensation payable by owners of 
all ships of 29.548 GT or less would be 20 million SDR (instead of 4.510.000 
SDR for tankers of less that 5000 GRT). The Fund is not a party to the agree-
ment, but the agreement confers legally enforceable rights on the 1992 Fund 
of indemnifi cation from the shipowner involved. 
The 1992 Fund will, in respect of ships covered by STOPIA, continue to be 
liable to compensation claimants if, and to the extent that, the total amount of 
admissible claims exceeds the limitation amount applicable to the ship in ques-
tion under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention. In other words, if the incident 
involves a ship to which STOPIA applies, the 1992 Fund will be entitled to 
indemnifi cation from the shipowner for the difference between the shipowner’s 
liability under the 1992 CLC and FUND Convention. 
V. 3 TOPIA 2006
As the scope of application of the STOPIA has been extended to all States 
parties to the 1992 Fund, the international group of P& I Clubs proposed an-
other voluntary scheme regarding incidents which would have occurred within 
the 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. Also with regard to TOPIA 2006, the 
aim has been to achieve a balance of contributions between the shipowning 
interest and the oil industry. TOPIA 2006 is based on the same principles as 
STOPIA 2006, however, there are also important differences. First of all TOPIA 
does not apply only to small tankers (as is the case with STOPIA) but to all 
tankers entered in one of the P&I Clubs, which are members of the Interna-
tional Group and reinsured through the pooling agreement. The functioning 
of TOPIA is somehow easier, as under TOPIA 2006, the owner of the ship 
involved in the incident will indemnify the Supplementary Fund for 50 % of 
the compensation the Fund pays under the Supplementary Fund Protocol for 
oil pollution to a Supplementary Fund member state. Therefore, if the incident 
involves a ship to which TOPIA 2006 applies, the Supplementary Fund will 
be entitled to indemnifi cation by the shipowner of 50 % of the compensation 
payments it had made to claimants. 
Fund member states, STOPIA 2006 will also apply to pollution damage in all other 
1992 Fund Member States. 
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The STOPIA and TOPIA agreements therefore do not affect the position 
of victims of oil pollution, as they only give to the Funds an enforceable right 
to claim reimbursement for compensation already paid from the Fund.62 
VI. CONCLUSION
The system embodied in the various CLC and Fund Conventions has been 
working remarkably well for almost 40 years and it is without exaggerating 
one of the most successful compensation schemes in existence. The disaster 
of the tankers Erika and Prestige showed, however, that the limits of liability 
provided by the mentioned conventions are too low to cover the entire damage 
which could arise as a result of a single accident of massive proportions. An 
important improvements was achieved with the entry into force of the 2003 
Supplementary Fund protocol in 2005, which established an additional fund 
of compensation, but only in cases when the damage occurs within the terri-
tory (including the EEZ or equivalent zone) of state parties to the protocol. 
The introduction of a third tier of compensation, which was welcomed espe-
cially by EU States and Japan, has at least formally increased the burden of 
contributions of the oil industry (at least in State Parties to the 2003 Protocol), 
as the contributors have to pay two separate contributions to the 1992 and to 
the 2003 Supplementary Fund. The shipowning interest (P&I Clubs) reacted 
with the adoption of two voluntary schemes STOPIA and TOPIA. This is an 
interesting precedent in international law and it shows the desire to retain the 
balance of contributions between shipowning interest and oil industry. It also 
shows the prevailing desire of member states that the basic principles of the 
CLC Convention should remain unaltered. It also shows that the majority of 
State parties are of the opinion, that the international compensation system 
must have at its centre the protection of the victim of oil pollution and not 
the achievement of other “policy reasons”, such as the safety of navigation or 
decreasing the number of oil spills. It is our conclusion therefore that in order 
62 STOPIA and TOPIA provide that a review of the functioning of the system should be 
carried out in 2016 and later on at the 5-year intervals. If the review reveals that either 
a shipowner or oil receivers have borne a proportion exceeding 60% of the overall costs 
of such claims, measures shall be taken for the purpose of maintaining an approximately 
equal apportionments.
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to fully protect the possible victims of oil pollution it is necessary for states to 
join all three tiers of compensation (the 1992 CLC, the 1992 Fund and the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Protocol). With this regard the accession of Slovenia and 
Croatia to the 2003 Supplementary Fund protocol is of utmost importance. 
As the CLC and the various Funds conventions cover only pollution damage 
caused by persistent oil carried in bulk as cargo, it is imperative that the Bunker 
Convention (covering spills of bunker oils) and the HNS convention (hazardous and 
noxious substances) enter into force as soon as possible. As a matter of fact, it does 
not make any difference to a victim of oil pollution whether pollution damage 
has occurred as a result of a spill of persistent oil, bunker oil or chemicals. In 
all cases, but especially in cases of accidental ship generated pollution, victims 




PROTOKOL IZ 2003. O DOPUNSKOM FONDU: 
VAÆNO POBOLJ©ANJE ME–UNARODNOG SUSTAVA 
NAKNADE ©TETE ZBOG ONE»I©ΔENJA ULJIMA 
U radu se raspravlja o novim dogaanjima na polju odgovornosti i naknade πtete zbog 
oneËiπÊenja uljima. Upozorava se na koristi od pristupanja jadranskih zemalja Protokolu 
o Dopunskom fondu iz 2003. Meunarodni sustav za naknadu πtete zbog oneËiπÊenja 
uljima, koji je u odreenoj mjeri saËinjen s obzirom na pravila o nuklearnoj πteti, priliËno 
je dobro funkcionirao u posljednjih Ëetrdeset godina. Jedan je od najuspjeπnijih postojeÊih 
sustava naknade πtete. U radu se naglaπava Ëinjenica da samo Ëlanstvo u sva tri stupnja 
sustava naknade πtete (pokrivenog CLC konvencijom iz 1992., Konvencijom o Fondu 
iz 1992. i Protokolom o Dopunskom fondu iz 2003.) moæe osigurati punu fi nancijsku 
zaπtitu ærtvama oneËiπÊenja uljima te da je pristupanje Republike Slovenije i Republike 
* Dr. sc. Marko Pavliha, profesor Fakulteta za pomorstvo i promet, Pot pomorπËakov 4, 
Portoroæ, Slovenija
** Mr. sc. Mitja Grbec, viπi predavaË Fakulteta za pomorstvo i promet, Pot pomorπËakov 4, 
Portoroæ, Slovenija
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Hrvatske Dopunskom fondu iz 2003. vaæan korak u ostvarenju toga cilja. Slabost 
sustava je u tome πto meunarodne konvencije koje su trenutaËno na snazi ne pokrivaju 
izlijevanje ulja koje je brodsko gorivo (uz odreene iznimke u pogledu tankera), kao ni 
opasne i πtetne tvari. Predlaæe se da jadranske zemlje preuzmu vaænu ulogu u promociji 
Bunker konvencije i HNS konvencije koje joπ nisu na snazi. Predlaæe se da se pitanja 
graanske odgovornosti rjeπavaju odvojeno od pitanja kaznene odgovornosti. Izmjene 
CLC konvencije se u ovom trenutku ne preporuËuju.
KljuËne rijeËi: odgovornost i naknada πtete za oneËiπÊenje uljima, Protokol o Dopunskom 
fondu iz 2003., konvencije pomorskog prava, zaπtita morskog okoliπa
